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1. The often-quoted expres-
sion ‘global financial crisis’
is avoided here because it
fails to describe accurately
both the vastly different
degrees of financial disrup-
tion experienced by differ-
ent parts of the world, and
the fact that the crisis was
largely resolved in the US
after less than two years,
while it remains unresolved
in Europe.
1 INTRODUCTION
One clear lesson from the US financial crisis of
2007-09 and the European financial crisis since
20071 has been the lack of adequate under-
standing of the linkages between the financial
system and the economy as a whole, hence the
generalised emphasis in the past few years on
‘macro-prudential’ policy and ‘macro-financial’
modeling and research (Galati and Moessner,
2011; Roger and Vlcek, 2012). Economists and
policymakers have gradually realised the extent
of the gaps in their analysis of the economic role
of the financial system, which were almost sys-
tematically overlooked in macroeconomic models.
Filling these gaps is now broadly understood as a
policy objective, not least as an analytical under-
pinning of better regulation of the financial system
(Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2011). But
advances in understanding and modeling are slow
and still at a far too-early stage to provide a basis
for policy (Goodhart et al, 2012).
In this context, renewed attention is being paid to
structures of the financial system(s) and how
such structures interact with the broader econ-
omy (Tarullo, 2012). Broadly speaking, there have
been three main aspects to this debate. The first
aspect, on which this paper is focused, is the
respective roles and mutual interaction of bank
and non-bank financial intermediation within a
given financial system, including the existence of
non-bank structures involving bank-like risks
often captured by the term ‘shadow banking’
(McCullen, 2007; Gorton, 2009; Pozsar et al, 2010;
Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012). The second aspect is
structures within the banking segment of the
broader financial system, including the debate
about so-called too-big-to-fail banks and the ques-
tion of legal, operational and/or accounting sepa-
ration between different sub-segments of banking
activity (Independent Commission on Banking,
2011; Goldstein and Véron, 2011). The third
aspect is the cross-border integration of the finan-
cial system and its relationship with both financial
stability and growth, a topic that before the crisis
tended to be studied more in-depth in the context
of emerging economies than advanced ones
(Edison et al, 2002; Rodrik and Subramanian,
2009) but which has gained attention since the
crisis as ‘financial fragmentation’ both at global
level (McKinsey Global Institute, 2013) and par-
ticularly in the euro-area context (IMF, 2012).
The debate about the respective roles and mutual
interactions of bank and non-bank financial inter-
mediation has tended in the past few years to be
focused primarily on concerns about shadow
banking, which is framed as a list of specific finan-
cial stability challenges that may be addressed by
targeted regulatory policy initiatives. These
include the risks associated with specific seg-
ments such as special investment vehicles, asset-
backed commercial paper conduits and other
types of securitisation products, repurchase
(repo) markets, securities lending, money market
mutual funds, and country-specific issues such
as the market for wealth management products in
China (European Commission, 2012; IIF, 2012;
FSB, 2012a and 2012b). However, there has often
been an implicit or explicit assumption that all
non-bank credit intermediation may constitute a
form of shadow banking – most visible in FSB
(2012a) which offers non-bank, non-insurance
credit intermediation as a ‘proxy’ for shadow bank-
ing in an international comparative perspective.
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Against this backdrop, the preliminary thoughts
presented in this paper are intended as a contri-
bution to a research effort that may more clearly
distinguish between shadow banking and non-
bank credit, and would focus on the broader fea-
tures of financial systems and frame the
assessment of new policy initiatives within this
more holistic approach.
CROSS-REGIONAL COMPARISON CHALLENGES
Differences in regulatory and statistical frame-
works make it notoriously difficult to make quan-
titative cross-border comparisons of financial
systems beyond the bluntest of indicators. Figure
1, which shows the evolution of stocks of bank
loans to non-financial corporations and non-finan-
cial corporate bonds in the world’s three largest
economic regions, provides a broad-brush indica-
tion of both the overall credit development trend
and the relative importance of bank credit.
Notwithstanding the differences in quantities
measured (eg loans to households are included
in the Asia data), Figure 1 captures some well-
known differences between the financial systems
and conditions of the three regions. Bond financ-
ing is considerably more developed in the US than
in comparably large economies; the financial
crisis has slowed or even reversed credit expan-
sion in the US and Europe but has barely dented it
in Asia. Interestingly, the US is the only one of the
three regions where the share of bond to total
financing, thus measured, has increased signifi-
cantly in that period (from 39 percent in 2007 to
47 percent in 2011), while it has increased only
slightly (from 11 to 13 percent) in Europe and not
at all (at 10 percent) in Asia. 
It is even more difficult to draw quantitative com-
parisons between shadow banking systems, if
only because the study of shadow banking is still
in an embryonic phase. Some go as far as arguing
that singling out the shadow banking system as a
category is unhelpful and that specific activities
(such as repo transactions or securities lending)
should instead be observed on a case-by-case
basis. The Institute of International Finance thus
claims that:
“Starting with the term and then attempting
to come up with a definitive list of 'shadow
banking' activities or entities conducting these
activities, or to come up with a single figure for
the size of 'shadow banking' is unworkable,
unnecessary, and risks being a diversion from
the real focus of policy, which should be the
mitigation of systemic risk. (...) the IIF believes
that a single figure, derived from Flow of Funds
data or other data, would be at best meaning-
less and at worst misleading. Indeed, there is
no inherent need to have a national or global
figure for 'shadow banking'. What is important
is to have data at the right level on the amount
of securitisation, repo, and so forth, in their own
right and as part of a macroprudential overview
of risks”(IIF, 2012).
Even among those who believe a quantitative
assessment of the shadow banking system as a
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Figure 1: Bank versus bond ﬁnancing (US$ billions)
Source: S&P (2012) based on central banks, Eurostat, IMF and Bank for International Settlements data. Note: * includes Aus-
tralia, China, India, Indonesia, and Korea (in 2012 China represented 60 percent of that area’s total GDP).whole is useful and desirable, there is a keen
acknowledgment of data limitation. Pozsar and
Singh (2011) note that “[t]he flow of funds
accounts, as currently designed, are insufficient
to adequately understand the shadow banking
system.” The European Central Bank, in what it
presents as the “first investigation of the size and
structure of shadow banking within the euro area”
(ECB, 2012), also acknowledges severe data lim-
itations2. For China, measurement challenges are
even greater given definitional variations, gaps in
data availability and the uncertain boundaries
between the financial system and non-financial
commercial entities (Ghosh et al, 2012; Li and
Hsu, 2012). 
THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS
Developments of the past half-decade have mod-
ified the balance between bank and non-bank
credit in different ways in the US, Europe and
China. This section attempts a stylised description
of key trends as a basis for discussion.
In the US, the banking system has both expanded
and shrunk as a consequence of the financial tur-
moil of 2007-08. Domestic non-bank broker-deal-
ers have ceased to exist as a major category
within the US financial system. Of the five firms
that dominated this segment until 2007, Bear
Stearns was bailed-out and purchased by JP
Morgan Chase; Lehman Brothers went bankrupt
and its US operations were taken over by Barclays
Capital; Merrill Lynch was purchased by Bank of
America; and the two independent survivors,
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, both
changed regulatory status by converting them-
selves into Bank Holding Companies. Meanwhile,
about 500 banks were placed into receivership
under the resolution authority of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and more
generally the banking sector has undergone sig-
nificant restructuring and deleveraging as mir-
rored by Figure 1. However, as Figure 1 also
suggests, US banks’ reduced propensity to lend
as a consequence of the crisis has been largely
compensated for by dynamic bond issuance
activity, and also by other forms of non-bank inter-
mediation, even though securitisation has been
negatively affected and still has a long way to go
to recover from the 2007-08 subprime-induced
shock. Among other structural trends, the tighten-
ing of bank regulation through the Dodd-Frank Act
of 2010 and the forthcoming adoption of the Basel
III Accord is resulting in an increasingly central
position of non-bank financial firms, including
large asset management companies, in core inter-
mediation functions that were long seen as the
exclusive remit of commercial and investment
banks3. 
In Europe, the restructuring and deleveraging of
the banking system has been much slower and
more gradual and, in all likelihood and unlike in the
US, much of it remains to come4. Equally damag-
ingly perhaps, and also unlike in the US, bond
issuance has not been much of a substitute for
more limited bank lending (Darvas, 2013). This
can also be seen in the United Kingdom, where
2. To the author’s knowl-
edge, no comparable study
exists for the entire Euro-
pean Union including EU
member states outside of
euro area.
3. See Gillian Tett, ‘“Black-
Rock envy” replaces the
allure of Goldman’, Financial
Times, 15 June 2012.
4. See eg Patrick Jenkins
and Brooke Masters, ‘That
shrinking feeling’, Financial
Times, 4 May 2012; and
Michael Stothard and Mary
Watkins, ‘Banks must
deleverage to the tune of
€3.4tn’, Financial Times, 18
March 2013.
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Figure 2: Euro-area ﬁnancial fragmentation, interest rate on bank loans to nonﬁnancial corporations*
Source: European Central Bank. Note: * interest rate on new bank loans to nonfinancial corporations (loans with rate fixation
period under 1 year). bond finance is comparatively much more devel-
oped than in the euro area (S&P, 2012). Moreover
in the euro area, the vicious circle between banks
and sovereigns has led to a trend of “financial frag-
mentation”(IMF, 2012) characterised by increas-
ingly divergent lending conditions, particularly for
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
depending on the country in which they operate.
Lending data collected by the ECB and presented
in Figure 2 illustrates this trend.
SMEs in Europe are generally not able to access
bond markets directly; moreover SME credit secu-
ritisation is not well developed in Europe and, in at
least several EU member states, severe regulatory
limits exist on the operations of certain types of
non-bank intermediation, such as leasing outside
of banking groups. If anything, aggregate lending
data such as that shown in Figure 1 tends to
underestimate the negative economic impact of
credit scarcity for SMEs, first because anecdotal
evidence suggests that banks maintain their lend-
ing relationships with larger, ‘blue-chip’ borrowers
as a matter of priority, and second because weak
banks tend to prioritise the extension of credit to
ailing borrowers in order to avoid the recognition
of losses that would be inevitable if such borrow-
ers default, a phenomenon that has been vari-
ously labelled ‘extend and pretend’ or ‘zombie
banking’, and which has been analysed both in the
US Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s and in the
Japanese crisis of the 1990s and early 2000s
(Kane, 1987; Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap,
2008). The upshot is that significant segments of
the EU economy appear to have severely
restricted access to financial credit as a result of
bank deleveraging, the euro crisis and the relative
lack of alternative financing channels.
In China, there has been a dynamic expansion in
recent years of both the bond markets and non-
bank financial intermediaries such as trust com-
panies, which have been reported as significantly
outpacing the growth of banks, most of which are
state-owned. According to such reports, in the
second half of 2012 non-bank credit provision
was even as large as bank financing for the first
time5. In the Financial Times’ estimate, assets
managed by trust companies reached RMB 6.3 tril-
lion in late September 2012 from only RMB 4.1 tril-
lion by end-2011, and ‘wealth management
products’ were expected to reach RMB 20 trillion
by the end of 2012 from RMB 800 billion five
years earlier6. The extraordinary expansion of
China’s financial sector over the past decade or so
has occurred without major financial disruption so
far, even though concerns have been aired repeat-
edly about the sustainability of the Chinese finan-
cial system’s current structures (eg Walter and
Howie, 2011) and have been fed more recently by
sustained investor demand for emerging market
securities more generally7. Even though assess-
ment is made difficult by the lack of comparable
data, available information suggests that the role
of non-bank credit is now greater in China than in
Europe in the financing of the economy, though
probably not as large as in the US. 
The trends are not only at regional or national
level. The deleveraging of European banks has led
them to sharply reduce their exposures to specific
global market segments, such as the financing of
infrastructure, commodities trading, or purchases
of aircraft or ships. While some of this activity has
been picked up by banks from other parts of the
world (particularly from Japan), part of the sub-
stitution has been not by banks but rather by non-
bank financial players including pension funds
and insurance companies8. More generally, trends
including regulatory initiatives such as Basel III,
the rigidity of many banks’ corporate culture and
the increasing difficulties they experience to
attract the best financial talent, and new data,
technologies and tools that enable smaller non-
bank actors to assess credit as effectively as
incumbent banks, might be contributing to a shift
of activity from banks to non-banks on a global
basis9.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This brief overview suggests that while the devel-
opment of non-bank credit has occasionally been
spurred by regulatory arbitrage or excessive
reliance on perceived public guarantees (such as
for US Money Market Mutual Funds), it has gener-
ally had rather beneficial economic conse-
quences (or its absence has been detrimental) in
the three regions observed: 
￿ In the US, non-bank credit channels have been
major contributors to the mitigation of the neg-
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5. Simon Rabinovitch, ‘Risk
increases in alternative
finance sector’, Financial
Times, 12 December 2012.
6. Simon Rabinovitch,
‘Uncertain foundations’,
Financial Times, 3
December 2012.
7. See eg Vivianne
Rodrigues and Stephen
Foley, ‘Concerns over high
demand for EM bonds’,
Financial Times, 28 March
2013.
8. See David Oakley,
‘Shadow banks fill
infrastructure debt void’,
Financial Times, 1 February
2013.
9. See John Dizard, ‘How
banking will and must
change’, Financial Times,
28 July 2012.REFERENCES
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